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Abstract
In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the
auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say
m) to display their ads. This auction is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T ). There are
click probabilities µij associated with each agent-slot pairs. The goal of the search engine is to maximize
social welfare of the advertisers, that is, the sum of values of the advertisers. The search engine does not
know the true values advertisers have for a click to their respective ads and also does not know the click
probabilities µijs. A key problem for the search engine therefore is to learn these click probabilities during
the T rounds of the auction and also to ensure that the auction mechanism is truthful. Mechanisms for
addressing such learning and incentives issues have recently been introduced and are aptly referred to as
multi-armed-bandit (MAB) mechanisms. When m = 1, characterizations for truthful MAB mechanisms are
available in the literature and it has been shown that the regret for such mechanisms will be O(T
2
3 ). In
this paper, we seek to derive a characterization in the realistic but non-trivial general case when m > 1 and
obtain several interesting results. Our contributions include: (1) When µijs are unconstrained , we prove that
any truthful mechanism must satisfy strong pointwise monotonicity and show that the regret will be O(T )
for such mechanisms. (2) When the clicks on the ads follow a certain click precedence property , we show that
weak pointwise monotonicity is necessary for MAB mechanisms to be truthful. (3) If the search engine has
a certain coarse pre-estimate of µij values and wishes to update them during the course of the T rounds, we
show that weak pointwise monotonicity and weakly separatedness are necessary and sufficient conditions for
the MAB mechanisms to be truthful. (4) If the click probabilities are separable into agent specific and slot
specific terms, we provide a characterization of MAB mechanisms that are truthful in expectation.
1 Introduction
Whenever a user searches any set of keywords on a search engine, along with the search results, called organic
results, the search engine displays advertisements related to those keywords on the right side of the organic
results. In pay-per-click sponsored search auctions, the search engine charges an advertiser for displaying her
ad only if a user clicks on her ad. The decision regarding which ads are be displayed and their respective
order is based on the bids submitted by the advertisers indicating the maximum amount they are willing to
pay per click. To perform any optimizations, such as maximizing social welfare or maximizing revenue to the
search engine, the true valuations of the advertisers are needed. Being rational, the advertisers may actually
manipulate their bids and therefore a primary goal of the search engine is to design an auction for which it is
in the best interest of each advertiser to bid truthfully irrespective of the bids of the other advertisers. Such an
auction is said to be Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC), or truthful.
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These auctions also take into account crucially the click probabilities or clickthrough rates (CTRs). Given
an agent i and a slot j, the click probability µij is the probability with which the ad of agent i will be clicked
if the ad appears in slot j. If the search engine knows the CTRs, then its problem is only to design a truthful
auction. However, the search engine may not know the CTRs beforehand. Thus the problem of the search
engine is two fold: (1) learn the CTR values (2) design a truthful auction. Typically, the same set of agents
compete for the given set of keywords. The search engine can exploit this fact to learn the CTRs by initially
displaying ads by various advertisers. Also note, it is reasonable to assume that they may not revise their bids
frequently.If the advertisers were bidding true values, the search engine’s problem would have been the same
as that of a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem [7] for learning the CTRs. Since the agents may not report
their true values, the problem of the search engine can be described as one of designing an incentive compatible
MAB mechanism. In the initial rounds, the search engine displays advertisements from all the agents to learn
the CTRs. This phase is referred to as exploration phase. Then it uses the information gained in these rounds
to maximize the social welfare. The latter phase is referred to as exploitation. The search engine will invariably
lose a part of social welfare for the exploration phase. The difference between the social welfare the search
engine would have achieved with the knowledge of CTRs and the actual social welfare achieved by a MAB
mechanism is referred to as regret. Thus, regret analysis is also important while designing a MAB mechanism.
1.1 Related Work
The problems where the decision maker has to optimize his total reward based on gained information as well as
gain knowledge about the available rewards are referred to as Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) problem. The MAB
problem was first studied by Robbins [7] in 1952. After his seminal work, MAB problems have been extensively
studied for regret analysis and convergence rates. Readers are referred to [2] for regret analysis in finite time
MAB problems. However, when a mechanism designer has to consider strategic behavior of the agents, these
bounds on regret would not work. Recently, Babaioff, Sharma, and Slivkins [3] have derived a characterization
for truthful MAB mechanisms in the context of pay-per-click sponsored search auctions if there is only a single
slot for each keyword. They have shown that any truthful MAB mechanism must have at least Ω(T
2
3 ) worst
case regret and also proposed a mechanism that achieves this regret. Here T indicates the number of rounds
for which the auction is conducted for a given keyword, with the same set of agents involved.
Devanur and Kakade [4] have also addressed the problem of designing truthful MAB mechanisms for pay-
per-click auctions with a single sponsored slot. Though they have not explicitly attempted a characterization
of truthful MAB mechanisms, they have derived similar results on payments as in [3]. They have also obtained
a bound on regret of a MAB mechanism to be O(T
2
3 ). Note that the regret in [4] is regret in the revenue to
the search engine, as against regret analysis in [3] is for social welfare of the advertisers. In this paper, unless
explicitly stated, when we refer to regret, we mean loss in social welfare as compared to social welfare that could
have been obtained with known CTRs.
In both of the above papers, only a single slot for advertisements is considered and therefore the practical
appeal is limited. Generalization of their work to the more realistic case of multiple sponsored slots is non-trivial
and our paper seeks to fill this research gap.
Prior to the above two papers, Gonen and Pavlov [5] had addressed the issue of unknown CTRs in multiple
slot sponsored search auctions and proposed a specific mechanism. Their claim that their mechanism is truthful
in expectation has been contested by [3, 4]. Also Gonen and Pavlov do not provide any characterization for
truthful multi-slot MAB mechanisms.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we extend the results of Babaioff, Sharma, and Slivkins [3] and Devanur and Kakade [4] to
the non-trivial general case of two or more sponsored slots. The precise question we address is: which MAB
mechanisms for multi-slot pay-per-click sponsored search auctions are dominant strategy incentive compatible
(or truthful)? We describe our specific contributions below.
In the first and most general setting (Section 3.1), we assume no knowledge of click through rate (µij) values
or any relationships among µij values. We refer to this setting as the “unknown and unconstrained CTR”
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setting. Here we show that any truthful mechanism must satisfy a highly restrictive property which we refer to
as strong pointwise monotonicity property. We show that all mechanisms satisfying this property will however
exhibit a high regret, which is O(T ). This immediately motivates our remaining Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4,
where we explore the following variants of the general setting which yield more reasonable characterizations.
First, in Section 3.2, we consider a setting where the realization is restricted according to a property which
we call the Higher Slot Click Precedence property (a click in a lower slot will automatically imply that a click is
received if the same ad is shown in any higher slot). For this setting, we provide a weaker necessary condition
than strong pointwise monotonicity. Finding a necessary and sufficient condition however remains open.
In Section 3.3, we provide a complete characterization of MAB mechanisms which are truthful in expectation
under a stochastic setting where a coarse estimate of µij is known to the auctioneer and to the agent i, perhaps
from some database of past auctions. Under this setting, the auctioneer updates his database of µij values
based on the observed clicks, thereby improving his estimate and maximizing revenue.
Finally, in Section 3.4, we derive a complete characterization of truthful multi-slot MAB mechanisms for a
stochastic setting where we assume that the µijs are separable into agent-dependent and slot-dependent parts.
Here, unlike the previous setting, we do not assume existence of any information on agent-dependent click
probabilities.
For all the above multi-slot sponsored search auction settings, we show that the slot allocation in truthful
mechanisms must satisfy some notion of monotonicity with respect to the agents’ bids and a certain weak
separation between exploration and exploitation.
Our results are summarized in Table 1.
Number of Learning Parameter Solution Concept Allocation rule Regret
Slots (m) (CTR)
m = 1 [3] Unrestricted DSIC Pointwise monotone and O(T 2/3)
Exploration separated
m > 1 Unrestricted DSIC Strongly pointwise monotone O(T)
and weakly separated
Higher Slot Click Precedence DSIC Weakly pointwise monotone regret analysis
and weakly separated not carried out
(Necessary Condition)
CTR Pre-estimates available Truthful in Weakly Pointwise monotone regret analysis
expectation and weakly separated not carried out
Separable CTR Truthful in Weakly Pointwise monotone O(T 2/3)
expectation and weakly separated (Experimental Evidence)
Table 1: Results
Our approach and line of attack in this paper follow that of [3] where the authors use the notions of pointwise
monotonicity, weakly separatedness and exploration separatedness quite critically in characterizing truthfulness.
Since our paper deals with the general problem of which theirs is a special case, these notions continue to
play an important role in our paper. However, there are some notable differences as explained below. We
generalize their notion of pointwise monotonicity in two ways. The first notion we refer to as strong pointwise
monotonicity and the second one as weak pointwise monotonicity. In addition to this, we introduce the key
notions of Influential Set, i-influentiality and Strongly influential. We use these new notions to define a non-
trivial generalization of their notion of weakly separatedness, to which we, however, continue to associate the
same name. The characterization of truthful mechanisms for a single parameter was provided by [1, 6]. For
deriving payments to be assigned to the agents for truthful implementation, we use the approach in [1, 6].
In Section 4, we provide some simple experimental results on regret analysis. We conclude the paper in
Section 5.
3
2 System Set up and Notation
In the auction considered, there are k agents and m ad slots (k ≥ m). Each agent has a single advertisement
that she wants to display and a private value vi which is her value per click on the ad. The auctioneer, that
is the search engine wishes to distribute the ads among these slots. These advertisements have certain click
probabilities which depend upon the agent as well as the slot with which the agent is associated. Let µij be
the probability of an ad of an agent i receiving click in slot j. Now, the goal of the search engine is to assign
these agents to the slots in such a way that the social welfare, which is the total value received by the bidders,
is maximized. However, there are two problems, (i) the search engine does not know vi, the valuations of the
agents and (ii) the search engine may not know the click probabilities µij .
So, the goal of the search engine is: (i) to design a DSIC auction in which it is in the agents’ interest to bid
their true values, vi’s (ii) to estimate µij . We consider multi-round auctions, where the search engine displays
the various advertisements repeatedly over a large number of rounds. The mechanism uses the initial rounds in
an explorative fashion to learn µij and then uses the other rounds exploitatively to gain value.
The system works as follows. At the start of the auction, each agent submits a sealed bid bi. Based on
this bid and the click information from previous rounds, the mechanism decides to allocate each ad slot to a
particular agent and then displays the m chosen ads. The user can now click on any number of these ads and
this information gets registered by the mechanism for future rounds. At the end of T rounds, depending on
the bids submitted by the agents and the number of clicks received by each agent, the agents have to make a
certain payment Pi to the mechanism.
Note: Pi and Ci are functions of b and ρ. Whenever the arguments are clear from the context, we just refer to
them as Pi and Ci.
A mechanism can be formally defined as the tuple (A,P ) where A is the allocation rule specifying the slot
allocation and P is the payment rule.
The important notation used in the paper is summarized in Table 2. Following this, we define the terms
used in this paper.
2.1 Important Notions and Definitions
Definition 2.1 (Realization ρ) We define a realization ρ as a vector (ρ(1), ρ(2), . . . , ρ(T )) where ρ(t) =
[ρij(t)]K×M is click information in round t. ρij(t) = 1, if an agent i’s ad receives a click in slot j in round t,
else 0.
It is to be noted that the mechanism observes only those ρij(t) where Aij(b, ρ, t) = 1.
Definition 2.2 (Clickwise Monotonicity) We
call an allocation rule A clickwise monotone if for a fixed (b−i, ρ), the number of clicks, Ci(bi, b−i, ρ) is a
non-decreasing function of bi. That is,
dCi(.)
dbi
≥ 0 ∀ (b−i, ρ).
Definition 2.3 (Weak Pointwise Monotonicity) We call an allocation rule weak pointwise monotone if,
for any given (b−i, ρ), and bid b
+
i > bi, Aij((bi, b−i), ρ, t) = 1⇒
Aij′ ((b
+
i , b−i), ρ, t) = 1 for some slot j
′ ≤ j, ∀t.
Definition 2.4 (Influential Set) Given a bid vector, b, a realization ρ and round t, an influential set I(b, ρ, t)
is the set of all agent-slot allocation pairs (i, j), such that (i) Aij(b, ρ, t) = 1 and (ii) a change in ρij(t) will
result in a change in the allocation in a future round. t is referred to as an influential round. Agent i is referred
to as an influential agent and j as influential slot w.r.t round t.
Definition 2.5 (i-Influential Set) We define the i-influential set N(b, ρ, i, t) ⊆ I(b, ρ, t) as the set of all
influential agent-slot pairs (i′, j′) such that change in ρi′j′ (t) will change the allocation of agent i in some future
round.
Definition 2.6 (Strongly Influential) We call a slot-agent pair (i∗, j∗) strongly influential in round t w.r.t.
the realization ρ(t), if changing the realization (toggling) in the bit ρi∗j∗(t) changes the allocation in a future
round. We call such a set (i∗, j∗, t) strongly i-influential if one of its influenced agents is i.
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K = {1, 2, . . . , k}, Set of agents
M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} Set of slots
i Index of an agent, i = 1, 2, . . . , k
j Index of a slot, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
T Total number of rounds
t A particular round. t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}
Aij(t) = 1 If an agent i is allocated slot j in round t
= 0 otherwise
A(t) (Aij(t))i∈K,j∈M
A = (A(1), A(2), . . . , A(T )), Allocation rule
ρij(t) = 1 if agent i gets a click in slot j in round t
= 0 otherwise
ρ(t) (ρij(t))i∈K,j∈M
ρ = (ρ(1), ρ(2), . . . , ρ(T ))
vi Agent i’s valuation of a click to her ad
bi Bid by agent i
b Bid vector, indicating bids of all the agents
= (bi, b−i) = (b1, b2, . . . , bk)
Ci(b, ρ) Total number of clicks obtained by an agent i
in T rounds
Pi(b, ρ) Payment made by agent i
P (b, ρ) = (P1(. ), P2(. ), . . . , Pk(. )), Payment rule
Ui(vi, b, ρ) Utility of an agent i in T rounds
= viCi(b, ρ)− Pi(b, ρ)
b+i A real number ¿ bi
αi Click probability associated with agent i
βj Click probability associated with slot j
µij The probability that an ad of an agent i receives
click when the agent is allotted slot j.
N(b, ρ, i, t) Set of slot agent pairs in round t
that influence agent i in some future rounds
CTR Click Through Rate (Click Probability)
DSIC Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible
Table 2: Notation
Definition 2.7 (Weakly Separated) We call an allocation rule weakly separated if for a given (b−i, ρ) and
two bids of agent i, bi and b
+
i where bi < b
+
i , N((bi, b−i), ρ, i, t) ⊆ N((b
+
i , b−i), ρ, i, t).
This means that when an agent i increases her bid, while the other parameters are kept fixed, the allocation in
the originally influential slots does not change, only new influential agent-slot pairs can get added. We continue
to use definitions of Normalized Mechanism and Non-degeneracy from [3]. With these preliminaries, we are now
ready to characterize truthful MAB mechanisms for various settings in the next section.
3 Characterization of Truthful MAB Mechanisms
Before stating our results, we prove a minor claim that we will use to develop our characterizations. We will
use this claim implicitly in our proofs.
Claim 3.1 Given (b, (ρ(1), ρ(2), . . . , ρ(t−1))), if (i∗, j∗) is i-influential in round t, then ∃ρ∗(t) such that (i∗, j∗)
is also strongly i-influential w.r.t. ρ∗(t) in round t.
Proof:
Suppose the claim is false. Let the i-influential set of slots in round t be N(b, ρ, i, t) = {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . ,
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(il, jl), (i∗, j∗)}. N(b, ρ, i, t) 6= φ since it has at least one element (i∗, j∗). Since we have assumed our claim to
be false, (i∗, j∗) is not strongly i-influential for any realization (ρi1j1(t), ρi2j2(t), . . . , ρiljl(t)) or the allocation
of agent i in future rounds is the same whether ρi∗j∗ is 0 or 1 for every given (ρi1j1(t), ρi2j2(t), . . . , ρiljl(t)). This
means that the allocation of agent i is the same in future rounds for all realizations (ρi1j1(t), ρi2j2(t), . . . , ρiljl(t), ρi∗j∗(t)).
But this contradicts the fact that {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . , (il, jl), (i∗, j∗)} is the set of i-influential slot-agent pairs
in round t. This proves our claim.

In our characterization of truthfulness under various settings, we show that a truthful allocation rule A must
be weakly separated. Though the proofs look similar, there are subtle differences in each of the following sub-
sections. In our proofs, we start with the assumption that a truthful allocation rule A is not weakly separated.
That is,
∃bi < b
+
i , b−i, ρ, t ∋ N(bi, b−i; ρ, t, i) 6⊆ N(b
+
i , b−i; ρ, t, i)
⇒ ∃(i∗, j∗) ∈ N(bi, b−i; ρ, t, i) ∋ (i
∗, j∗) 6∈ N(b+i , b−i; ρ, t)
(1)
Subsequently, we show that this leads to a contradiction in each of the subsections, implying the necessity of
weakly separatedness.
3.1 Unknown and Unconstrained CTRs
In this setting, we do not assume any previous knowledge of the CTRs although we do assume that such CTRs
exist. Here, we show that any mechanism that is truthful under such a setting must follow some very rigid
restrictions on its allocation rule.
Definition 3.1 (Strong Pointwise Monotonicity) An allocation rule is said to be strongly pointwise mono-
tone if it satisfies: For any fixed (b−i, ρ), if an agent i with bid bi is allocated a slot j in round t, then ∀ b
+
i > bi,
she is allocated the same slot j in round t. That is if the agent i receives a slot in round t, then she receives
the same slot for any higher bid. For any lower bid, either she may receive the same slot or may loose the
impression.
Theorem 3.1 Let (A,P ) be a deterministic, non-degenerate mechanism for the MAB, multi-slot sponsored
search auction, with unconstrained and unknown µij . Then, mechanism (A,P ) is DSIC iff A is strongly
pointwise monotone and weakly separated. Further, the payment scheme is given by,
Pi(bi, b−i; ρ) = biCi(bi, b−i; ρ)−
∫ bi
0
Ci(x, b−i; ρ)dx.
Proof:
The proof is organized as follows. In step 1, we show the necessity of the payment structure. In step 2, we show
the necessity of strong pointwise monotonicity. Step 3 proves the necessity of weakly separatedness. Finally in
step 4, we prove that the above payment scheme in conjunction with strong pointwise monotonicity and weakly
separatedness imply that the mechanism is DSIC.
Step 1: The utility structure for each agent i ∈ N is
Ui(vi, (bi, b−i), ρ) = viCi((bi, b−i), ρ)− Pi((bi, b−i), ρ)
The mechanism is DSIC iff it is the best response for each agent to bid truthfully. That is, by bidding
truthfully, each agent’s utility is maximized. Thus
(A,P ) is DSIC ⇔ dUidbi |bi=vi = 0 and
d2Ui
db2i
|bi=vi ≤ 0 ∀vi.
From the first order equation, we obtain,
bi
dCi
dbi
−
dPi
dbi
= 0 ∀bi
We need Pi(0) = 0 for normalization. Integrating the above and by second order conditions, we need
dCi
dbi
≥ 0,
which is the clickwise monotonicity condition.
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Thus, for (A,P ) to be DSIC, we need
Pi(bi, b−i; ρ) = biCi(bi, b−i; ρ)−
∫ bi
0
Ci(x, b−i; ρ)dx
and
dCi
dbi
≥ 0 ∀((bi, b−i), ρ) (2)
Step 2: We first prove the necessity of strong pointwise monotonicity by contradiction. We have seen from (2)
that dCidbi ≥ 0 ∀((bi, b−i), ρ) is necessary for DSIC of A. We show that if A is not strongly pointwise monotone,
then there exists some allocation and realization ρ for which dCidbi < 0. If A is not strongly pointwise monotone,
there exists (bi, b
+
i , b−i, ρ, t) ∋
Aij1 ((bi, b−i), ρ, t) = 1 and Aij2 ((b
+
i , b−i), ρ, t) = 1,
where j1 6= j2 (3)
Over all such counter-examples, choose the one with the minimum t. By this choice, we ensure that in this
example ∀t′ < t, we have Aij(bi, t
′) = Aij(b
+
i , t
′). The only difference occurs in round t. Now, consider the
game instance where ρij1 (t) = 1, ρij2 (t) = 0, ρij(τ) = 0∀ τ > t. The occurrence of such ρ has non-zero
probability. Now, under (b−i, ρ), agent i has the same allocation and the same number of clicks until round
(t− 1) independent of whether she bids bi or b
+
i . However, in round t with bid bi, she receives a click and with
bid b+i she does not, implying for this case that
dCi
dbi
< 0. This violates the click monotonicity requirement. So,
strong pointwise monotonicity is indeed a necessary condition for truthful implementation of MAB mechanisms
under this setting.
Step 3: We prove the necessity of the weakly separatedness condition by contradiction. That is we assume (1).
Over all such possible counter-examples of bi, b
+
i , b−i, ρ, choose the one with the least t. Now, either i
∗ = i or
i∗ 6= i.
Case 1: (i∗ = i). Consider the realization ρ′ differing from ρ only in round t in the entry ρi∗j∗ . That is,
ρ′i∗j∗(t) = 1 − ρi∗j∗(t) and ρ
′
i′j(t
′′) = ρi′j(t
′′) ∀(i′, j, t′′) 6= (i∗, j∗, t). We can assume, ρij(τ) = 0 ∀ τ > t as the
clicks in future rounds do not affect decisions in the current round. Since (i∗ = i, j∗) is not part of the allocation
in round t under the original bid bi, the difference between ρ and ρ
′ is not observed by the mechanism. However,
the prices computed by the payment scheme (2) to agent i differ under these two realizations. (See [3] for details
on why the payments are different).
Case 2: i∗ 6= i. Now, choose ρ(t) to be that realization for which (i∗, j∗) is strongly i-influential. Now,
let t′ be the first round i-influenced by (i∗, j∗, t). Consider the realization ρ′ which differs from ρ in that
ρ′i∗j∗(t) = 1− ρi∗j∗(t). Agent i’s allocation and click information differs only in round t
′ under the two different
realizations ρ and ρ′. Now, let Aij1 ((bi, b−i), ρ, t
′) = 1 and Aij2((bi, b−i), ρ
′, t′) = 1 or agent i gets slot j1 in
round t′ with bid bi under realization ρ and slot j2 under realization ρ
′. Here since the two differ only in
ρi∗j∗(t), by the strongly i-influential nature of (i
∗, j∗, t) under this realization we have j1 6= j2. Without loss of
generality, let j1 < j2 (or j1 be the better slot, since it is possible that one of the realizations leads to no slot
allocation). Now, we choose ρ(t′) = ρ′(t′) in the following manner: ρij1 (t
′) = ρ′ij1 (t
′) = 1, ρij2 (t
′) = ρ′ij2 (t
′) = 0,
and ρij(τ) = ρ
′
ij(τ) = 0, ∀ τ > t
′. We can make such an arbitrary choice since the realization from the round t′
onwards does not affect the allocation in round t.
Under this choice of ρ and ρ′, agent i clearly gets more clicks under realization ρ than ρ′ with bid bi.
Now, agent i’s number of clicks varies with her bid based on only her allocation in round t′ which changes
only if with bid x the pair (i∗, j∗) is i-influential in round t with t′ earliest influenced round. With any such
bid x, under realization ρ′, agent i will either get slot j2 in round t
′ or no slot at all (by strong pointwise
monotonicity), which in turn means that she will never get a click under realization ρ′ in round t′. Hence,
Ci((x, b−i), ρ) ≥ Ci((x, b−i), ρ
′)∀x ≤ b+i . Additionally, we have Ci((x0, b−i), ρ) > Ci((x0, b−i), ρ
′). Using these
relations and the non-degeneracy condition (see [3] for details), we have Pi((b
+
i , b−i), ρ) < Pi((b
+
i , b−i), ρ
′). ρ′
only differs from ρ in the unobserved bit (i∗, j∗, t). Hence, the mechanism fails to assign unique payment to
agent i leading to a contradiction. This shows the necessity of weakly separatedness.
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Step 4: Finally, we show that strong pointwise monotonicity and weakly separatedness are sufficient conditions
for clickwise monotonicity and computability of the payments and hence for truthfulness. Suppose A is a strongly
pointwise monotone and weakly separated allocation rule. So, it clearly satisfies the clickwise monotonicity. Now,
by the weakly separatedness condition, we already have all the information required to calculate the allocation
of agent i in every round for every bid x < bi. This is because the i-influential set for bids x < bi is a subset
of the known influential set, we already have all the possible click information required for the i-influential
sets. Additionally, by the strong pointwise monotonicity condition, we know that for each bid x < bi and
each round t, either agent i keeps the same slot she had in the observed game instance (bi, b−i; ρ) or loses the
impression altogether, that is, does not get a click. Hence, we have all the information required to compute
Pi(bi, b−i; ρ) = biCi(bi, b−i; ρ)−
∫ bi
0
Ci(x, b−i; ρ)dx. This completes the sufficiency part of the theorem.

Implications of Strong Pointwise Monotonicity
For a given round t, if an agent i is allocated a slot j, then by the definition of strong pointwise monotonicity
she receives the same slot for any higher bid that she places. If she lowers her bid, she may either retain the
slot j, or lose the impression entirely. This leads to the strong restriction that an agent’s bid can only decide
whether or not she obtains an impression, and not which slot she actually gets. As we shall show below, this
restriction has serious implications on the regret incurred by any truthful mechanism.
Regret Estimate
In the single slot case it is a known result that the worst case regret is O(T 2/3) [3]. So, for the multi-slot case,
the regret is Ω(T 2/3). We show here that the worst case regret generated in the multi-slot general setting by a
truthful mechanism is in fact O(T ). We show this for the 2 slot, 3 agent case with an intuitive argument, which
can be generalized.
Consider a setting with two slots and three competing agents, that is m = 2, k = 3. Let the agents be A1,
A2 and A3. By Theorem 3.1, any truthful mechanism has to be strongly pointwise monotone. That is, in any
round, the bids of the agents only determine which agents will be displayed and not the slots they obtain.
Suppose, A3’s bid b3 < min(b1, b2) in addition to having low CTRs. In this case, any mechanism that grants
A3 an impression O(T ) times, will have regret O(T ).
So, we can assume that A′3s ad gets an impression for a very small number of times when compared with T .
Thus, ads by A1 and A2 will appear O(T ) times. In each round, A1 will get either slot 1 or slot 2 independent
of her bid, while the other slot is assigned to A2.
In any strongly pointwise monotone mechanism, either A1 is assigned a slot 1 O(T ) times or slot 2.
Without loss of generality, we assume that A1 is assigned slot 1 O(T ) times. So, the allocation (slot 1,
slot 2)↔(A1,A2) is made O(T ) times. Consider a game instance where this is not the welfare maximizing
assignment, that is, the relation (µ11b1 + µ22b2) < (µ12b1 + µ21b2) holds true. Since the slot allocation does
not depend on the individual bids, such an instance can occur. In such a setting (A2, A1) would have been
optimal assignment. As a result, each round having the allocation (A1, A2) incurs constant non-zero regret.
Since such an allocation occurs O(T ) times, the mechanism has a worst case regret of O(T ). Hence any truthful
mechanisms under the unrestricted CTR setting exhibit a high O(T ) regret.

Since the strong monotonicity condition places such a severe restriction on A and also leads to a very high
regret, in the following sections we explore some relaxations on the assumption that µij ’s are unrelated. With
such settings which are in fact practically quite meaningful, we are able to prove more encouraging results.
3.2 Higher Slot Click Precedence
This setting is similar to the general one discussed above in that we do not assume any knowledge about the
CTRs. However, we impose a restriction on the realization ρ that it follows higher slot click precedence defined
below.
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Definition 3.2 A realization ρ is said to follow Higher Slot Click Precedence if ∀ i ∈ K, ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
ρij1(t) = 1⇒ ρij2 (t) = 1 ∀j2 < j1
Higher slot click precedence implies that if an agent i obtains a click in slot j1 in round t, then in that round,
she receives a click in any higher slot j2. This assumption is in general valid in the real world since any given
user (fixed by round t) who clicks on a particular ad when it is displayed in a lower slot would definitely click
on the same ad if it was shown in a higher slot.
We show, under this setting, that weak pointwise monotonicity and weakly separatedness are necessary
conditions for truthfulness. They are, however, not sufficient conditions. Clearly, strong pointwise monotonicity
and weakly separatedness will still be sufficient conditions. A weaker sufficient condition for truthfulness under
this setting is still elusive.
Implications of the Assumption
Observe that a slot-agent pair (i, j) is influential in some round t only if changing the realization in the entry
ρi,j(t) for some realization ρ results in a change in allocation in some future round. Crucial to the influentiality
is the fact that ρij(t) can change.
Now, consider the following situation: it has been observed that in the game instance ((bi, b−i), ρ), we
have ρij1(t) = 0 where agent i obtains slot j1 in round t. We are interested in the game instance ((x, b−i), ρ)
where agent i gets slot j2 > j1 where x < bi and in knowing whether (i, j2) is an influential pair in round t
for some influenced agent. Now, since ρij1 = 0 and j1 < j2, by our defining assumption, we conclude that
ρij2(t) = 0 ∀x < bi. Hence, our mechanism knows that in all the relevant cases, the realization in the given
slot-agent pair never changes. Hence, (i, j2) cannot be an influential pair for any j2 > j1 in round t. We will
use this observation in the proof of necessity characterization.
Proposition 3.1 Consider the setting in which realization ρ follows Higher Slot Click Precedence. Let (A,P )
be a deterministic non-degenerate DSIC mechanism for this setting. Then the allocation rule A must be weak
pointwise monotone and weakly separated. Further, the payment scheme is given by,
Pi(bi, b−i; ρ) = biCi(bi, b−i; ρ)−
∫ bi
0
Ci(x, b−i; ρ)dx
Proof:
The proof for the payment scheme is identical to that in Theorem 3.1. We prove the necessity of weak pointwise
monotonicity and weakly separatedness.
Step 1: We first prove the necessity of weak pointwise monotonicity, in a very similar fashion to that of the
necessity of strong pointwise monotonicity in Theorem 3.1. The crucial difference is, while constructing ρ, we
have to ensure that it satisfies the higher order click precedence. Suppose A is truthful but not weakly pointwise
monotone, that is, ∃ (bi, b
+
i , b−i, ρ, t) and
Aij1 (bi, b−i), ρ, t = 1 and Aij2 ((b
+
i , b−i), ρ, t) = 1 for some j1 < j2. Over all such examples, choose the one with
the least t. By this choice, we ensure that in this example, ∀t′ < t, we have Aij(bi, t
′) = Aij(b
+
i , t
′). The only
difference occurs in round t. Now, consider the game instance where ρij1 (t) = 1 and ρij2(t) = 0. Such realization
has a non-zero probability of occurrence. Now, under (b−i, ρ), agent i gets the same allocation and the same
number of clicks until round (t− 1) independent of whether she bids bi or b
+
i . However, in round t with bid bi
she gets a click and with bid b+i she does not, implying for this case that
dCi
dbi
< 0. This leads to a contradiction.
So, weak pointwise monotonicity is a necessary condition. If A is not strongly pointwise monotone, does
not violate clickwise monotonicity. That is, for truthful A, it may possible that, Aij1 ((bi, b−i), ρ, t) = 1 and
Aij2 ((b
+
i , b−i), ρ, t) = 1 where j2 < j1. Thus, for A to be truthful, strong pointwise monotonicity may not be
necessary.
Next, we prove the necessity of the weakly separatedness condition. Again, we prove this claim by contra-
diction. We follow the same steps as in proof of Theorem 3.1, except we need to justify our choices of ρ, as it
should satisfy higher order click precedence property.
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Case 1: (i∗ = i). Here, as in the previous proof we choose ρ′ such that, ρ′i∗j∗(t) = 1−ρi∗j∗(t) and ∀ (i
′, j, t′′) 6=
(i∗, j∗, t) ρ′i′j(t
′′) = ρi′j(t
′′). We need to show that this choice of ρ does not contradict the higher slot click
precedence. Now, from our assumption, (i∗, j∗) is an influential pair in round t. From our observation in
Section 3.2, it follows that ρi∗j∗(t) and ρ
′
i∗j∗(t) must be able to take any value from {0, 1}. It also forces that
∀j < j∗, ρi∗j(t) = 1. Since (i
∗, j∗) = (i, j∗) is not part of the allocation in round t under the original bid bi, the
difference between ρ and ρ′ is not observed by the mechanism. However, the payments by agent i differ under
these two realizations (see [3] for details on why the payments are different).
Case 2: i∗ 6= i. Here, over all examples with (i∗, j∗) influential pair in round t with influenced agent i in the
earliest influenced round t′, we choose the one with minimum x0. In this case, our choice of ρ(t) and ρ
′(t) is the
same as in Theorem 3.1, while our choice of ρ(t′) = ρ′(t′) differs. Again the choice of ρ(t) and ρ′(t) is a valid
assumption by the influentiality of (i∗, j∗). Without loss of generality, let j1 < j2 where j1 and j2 are defined
as in Theorem 3.1. Now, we choose ρ(t′) = ρ′(t′) in the following manner: ρij(t
′) = ρ′ij(t
′) = 1 ∀j ≤ j1 and
ρij′ (t
′) = ρ′ij′ (t
′) = 0 ∀j′ > j1. We can make such an arbitrary choice since the realization from the round t
onwards does not affect the allocation in round t. Now, the rest of the arguments from the proof of Theorem
3.1 follow and lead to contradiction that a mechanism can not distinguish between ρ and ρ′, however it needs
to assign different payments under these realizations. This shows the necessity of weakly separatedness.

3.3 When CTR Pre-estimates are Available
In this setting, we assume the existence of some previous database or pre-estimate of CTR values but no
restriction on ρ. That is, µij =
Xij
Yij
where Xij is the number of clicks obtained by agent i in slot j out of
the Yij times she obtained the slot j over all past auctions. Here, in general, µi1 ≥ µi2 ≥ . . . ≥ µim. For our
characterization, we assume that each µi = (µi1, µi2, . . . , µim) is known to the agent i and the auctioneer.
In this setting, the auctioneer uses explorative rounds to improve his estimate of the CTRs and updates
the database. Then, he makes use of his new knowledge of the CTRs in the exploitative rounds. The payment
scheme, however, only makes use of the old CTR matrix. Under this scheme, we derive the conditions required
for a mechanism to be truthful in expectation over µ, defined as follows.
Definition 3.3 (Truthful in Expectation) A mechanism is said to be truthful in expectation over µ, the
CTR pre-estimate, if each of the agents believes that the number of clicks she obtains is indeed
∑
t
∑
j(µijAij),
which is the number of clicks she will obtain if the CTR pre-estimate is perfectly accurate.
3.3.1 Fairness
For this characterization, we need the notion of fair allocation rules, as defined below.
Definition 3.4 (Fair Allocation) Consider two game instances ((bi, b−i), ρ) and ((b
′
i, b−i), ρ) having the same
slot-agent-round triplets, (i′, j′, t′) as strongly i-influential. Let (i∗, j∗, t) be such triplet with the smallest t′ in
which i is influenced. Consider the realization ρ′ differing from ρ only in this influential element ρi∗j∗(t). Then,
the allocation rule A is said to be fair if for every such pair of games it happens that
∑
j µijAij((bi, b−i), ρ, t
′) ≥
∑
j µijAij((bi, b−i), ρ
′, t′)⇔
∑
j µijAij((b
′
i, b−i), ρ, t
′) ≥
∑
j µijAij((b
′
i, b−i), ρ
′, t′)
The intuition behind fair allocations is that changing the realization only in a fixed strongly i-influential
slot generally changes agent i’s allocation in a predictable fashion independent of her own bid, either improving
her slot or worsening it in the earliest influenced round, irrespective of the allocation or realization in the rest
of the game. For example, if agent i’s chief competitor agent, i′, is strongly i-influential, then i′ not getting a
click in the influential round will generally mean that agent i will go on to get a better slot than if agent i′ got
a click, independent of bi.
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3.3.2 Truthfulness Characterization
1
Here, the expected utility for the agent i,
Ui(vi, b, ρ) = (
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
µijAij(b, t)vi)− Pi(b, µ) (4)
Proposition 3.2 Let (A,P ) be a normalized mechanism under this setting. Then, the mechanism is truthful
in expectation over µ iff A is weakly pointwise monotone and the payment rule is given by
Pi(b, µ) =
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
µij{biAij(b, µ, t)−
∫ bi
0
Aij(x, b−i, µ, t)dx}
and payments are computable.
Proof:
In Step 1, we prove the necessity and sufficiency of the payment structure. For the mechanism to be implemented,
we need to compute the payments of all the agents uniquely. That is, Pis need to be computable for all agents
i. In Step 2, we show weak pointwise monotonicity is equivalent to the second order condition which is clickwise
monotonicity in the context of this paper.
Step1: The expected utility of an agent i is given by (4).
The (A,P ) is truthful iff dUidbi |bi=vi = 0 &
d2Ui
db2
i
|bi=vi ≤ 0 ∀vi.
From the first order condition we get,
Pi(b, µ) =
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
µij{biAij(b, µ, t)−
∫ bi
0
Aij(x, b−i, µ, t)dx}
From the second order condition, we need,
∀ i,
∑
t
∑
j
µij
dAij
dbi
≥ 0 (5)
Step 2: We show, (5) ⇔ weak pointwise monotonicity.
(i) It is obvious that weak pointwise monotonicity ⇒∑
t
∑
j µij
dAij
dbi
≥ 0. An increase in bi under a weakly pointwise monotone A would result in a better slot
allocation for agent i. This in turn, would result in an increase in
∑
j µijAij in each round.
(ii) Now we prove the converse. Suppose A is not weakly pointwise monotone. That is, ∃ i, bi, b
+
i , b−i, ρ, µ, t ∋
Aij(bi, b−i, ρ, µ, t) = 1 and Aij′ (b
+
i , b−i, ρ, µ, t) = 1 where j
′ > j. Consider the smallest such t. Allocation in
this round does not depend upon the realization of this round or of future rounds. We consider the instance of
the game where ρij(t) = 1 and ρij′ (t) = 0 and t is the last round. Such an instance has a non-zero probability
and for this instance,
∑
t
d
dbi
∑
j µijAij < 0. This proves the equivalence claim.

Note, it is crucial that each µij is a previously known constant and cannot be defined as µij = Xij/Yij based
on the clicks in the current T rounds post facto. If we do so, Xij/Yij can change with the allocation of agent
i in a particular game and hence, µij would become a function of bi and the mechanism would be no longer
truthful.
1Note, the characterization in this section would hold even if µij are arbitrary weights. However, while using arbitrary weights,
mechanism may charge some agents more than their actual willingness to pay. Also regret in the revenue, that is loss in the revenue
to the search engine will be trivially O(T ).
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For truthful implementation, the payments need to be computable and computing the payments may involve
the unobserved part of ρ. In the next theorem, we show that weakly separatedness is necessary and sufficient
for computation of these payments. So, along with the computation of payments and the above proposition, we
get,
Theorem 3.2 Let (A,P ) be a mechanism for this stochastic multi-round auction setting where A is a non-
degenerate, deterministic and fair allocation rule. Then, (A,P ) is truthful in expectation over µ iff A is weakly
pointwise monotone and weakly separated and the payment scheme is given by
Pi(b, ρ) =
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
µij{biAij(b, ρ, t)−
∫ bi
0
Aij(x, b−i, ρ, t)dx}
Proof:
2 This setting/characterization works best with old advertisers who have already taken part in a large number
of auctions. As we already have proved Proposition 3.2, we just need to show that weakly separatedness is in
fact a necessary and sufficient condition for the computability of payments, that is, computability of∑m
j=1 µij
∫ bi
0 Aij(x, b−i, ρ, t)dx for each agent i.
Step 1: We first provide the proof for the sufficiency of weakly separatedness. Suppose A is weakly separated.
The mechanism observes and knows all allocations and the observed realization for the game instance carried out
with the original bid vector (bi, b−i). Specifically, it knows N((bi, b−i), i, ρ, t) for all rounds t and the respective
realizations in these slots. Now, in the game instance (x, b−i) where x ≤ bi, by weakly separatedness, we have
N((x, b−i), i, ρ, t) ⊆ N((bi, b−i), i, ρ, t). This means that the allocation in i-influential slots for game instance
((x, b−i)t) is a subset of that in observed game instance ((bi, b−i), ρ). So, the mechanism already knows all
the click information in the i-influential slots for the game instance ((x, b−i), ρ). Since the payment scheme is
only interested in the allocation of agent i, the realization in the unobserved slots is unimportant and can be
assumed arbitrarily. Thus, the mechanism has complete information to compute Pi((bi, b−i), ρ, t).
Step 2: Next, we prove the necessity of weakly separatedness by contradiction. That is, we assume (1) is true.
Consider a complete realization ρ(t) in round t for which (i∗, j∗) is strongly i-influential (such a realization exists
by our previous theorem) and construct the two complete realizations ρ and ρ′ from (ρ(1), ρ(2), . . . , ρ(t−1), ρ(t))
which only differ in ρi∗j∗(t).Over all choices of counter-examples (bi, t, ρ(t), i
∗, j∗), we choose the one which has
the smallest influenced round t′. Now, we compare the payment that the mechanism has to make for this game
instance at the end of t′ rounds under the two different realizations ρ and ρ′.
Let ϕ ∈ {ρ, ρ′}. By the strong i-influence of (i∗, j∗, t), the agent i gets different allocations in round t′ under
the different realizations ρ and ρ′. This implies,∑
j µijAij((bi, b−i), ρ, t
′) 6=
∑
j µijAij((bi, b−i), ρ
′, t′).
Without loss of generality,
∑
j
µijAij((bi, b−i), ρ, t
′) >
∑
j
µijAij((bi, b−i), ρ
′, t′) (6)
(or agent i gets a higher slot under realization ρ than ρ′).
By the non-degeneracy of A, there exists a finite interval of bids about bi such that for every bid x in this
interval,
Aij((x, b−i), ϕ, t
′) = Aij((bi, b−i), ϕ, t
′)∀j (7)
Suppose x′ ∈ (0, b+i ) is another bid such that the same slot-agent-round set (i
∗, j∗, t) is strongly i-influential
with the same influenced round t′ for the game ((x′, b−i), ρ). Then by the fairness of A,
∑
j
µijAij((x
′, b−i), ρ, t
′) ≥
∑
j
µijAij((x
′, b−i), ρ
′, t′) (8)
2The idea for our proof is similar to that in the characterization of the single-slot case [3]; however, the details are non-trivially
different.
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From (6),(7), and (8) and using the fact that t′ the smallest influenced round that is strongly i-influenced
by the bit ρi∗j∗(t) which is the only differing bit between ρ and ρ
′, we can see that ∀ x′ ∈ (0, b+i )∑
j
µijAij((x
′, b−i), ρ, t
′) ≥
∑
j
µijAij((x
′, b−i), ρ
′, t′) (9)
and ∃ a finite interval X around bid bi such that ∀x ∈ X , we have,∑
j
µijAij((x, b−i), ρ, t
′) >
∑
j
µijAij((x, b−i), ρ
′, t′) (10)
From equations (9) and (10), and the fact that agent i’s allocation is the same under both realizations ρ and
ρ′ until round t′ (from smallest influenced round choice), we conclude that,∑t′
t=1
∫ b+
i
0
∑
j µijAij((x, b−i), ρ, t)dx >∑t′
t=1
∫ b+
i
0
∑
j µijAij((x, b−i), ρ
′, t)dx
Additionally, we can assume that there are no clicks after round t′. As a result, we have Pi(b
+
i , b−i, ρ) 6=
Pi(b
+
i , b−i, ρ
′). However, the mechanism cannot distinguish between the two realizations ρ and ρ′ as the only
differing bit ρi∗j∗(t) is unobserved. Hence, the mechanism fails to assign a unique payment to agent i. This is a
consequence of our initial assumption (1).Thus if A is not weakly separated the payments are not computable.
This completes the proof.

3.4 When CTR is Separable
In the previous setting we assumed that some pre-estimate on the CTR matrix [µij ] existed. In real world
applications, however, it is very often the case that the slot-dependent probabilities are known while the agent
dependent probabilities are unknown. To leverage this fact, we make a widely accepted assumption: we assume
that the click probability due to the slot is independent of the click probability due to the agent. That is, we
assume that µij = αiβj , where αi is the click probability associated with agent i and βj is the click probability
associated with slot j. We also assume that the vector β = (β1, β2, . . . , βm) is common knowledge. In general
β1 ≥ β2 . . . ≥ βm. Here, any mechanism will use the explorative rounds to try to learn the values of αi as
accurately as possible.
Let Yij denote the number of times that agent i obtains the impression for slot j, and Xij denote the
corresponding number of times she obtains a click. Then, we define α′i = avgj{
1
βj
Xij
Yij
} and µ′ij = α
′
iβj .
In this section, we assume
dα′i
dbi
= 0 or that α′i does not change with bid bi. We are justified in making this
assumption since α′i is a good estimate of αi which is independent of which slot agent i obtains how many times.
By changing her bid bi, agent i can only alter her allocations which should not predictably or significantly affect
α′. It is trivial to see that
dα′i
dbi
= 0⇒
dµ′ij
dbi
.
We model truthfulness based on the utility gained by each agent in expectation over this µ′ij . That is, utility
to an agent i is given by equation (4), with µ being replaced by µ′. With the above setup, it can easily be
seen that truthfulness mechanisms under this setting have the same characterization as the truthful mechanisms
with a pre-estimate of CTR.
Theorem 3.3 Let (A,P ) be a mechanism for the stochastic multi-round auction setting where A is a non-
degenerate, deterministic and fair allocation rule. Then, (A,P ) is truthful in expectation over µ′ iff A is weakly
pointwise monotone and weakly separated and the payment scheme is given by
Pi(b, ρ) =
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
µ′ij{biAij(b, ρ, t)−
∫ bi
0
Aij(x, b−i, ρ, t)dx}
Proof:
This theorem can be proven using similar arguments as used in the proof of Theorem 3.2, with µ being replaced
by µ′.

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4 Experimental Analysis
Since the single slot setting is a special case of the multi-slot setting, we obtain Ω(T 2/3) as a lower bound for
the regret incurred by a truthful multi-slot sponsored search mechanism.
We have characterized truthful MAB mechanisms in various settings in the previous section. However, we
have not studied MAB mechanisms in multi-slot auctions for regret estimation in such mechanisms (except the
O(T ) worst case bound we showed for the unconstrained case in Section 3.1). In this section, we present a brief
experimental study on the regret of an truthful MAB mechanism for multi-slot sponsored search auction under
separable CTR case.
For our study, we have picked a simple mechanism belonging to the separable CTR case. In the simulation,
we displayed the agents in the available slots in a round robin fashion for the first T
2
3 rounds. Then, we used
the observed information on the clicks to estimate the µij values. The payments were computed as per Theorem
(3.3).
We performed simulations for various T values with k = 4 and m = 2. For a fixed T , we generated 100T
different instances. and estimated the average case as well as worst case regrets. In each instance, we generate
CTRs and bids randomly. Figure 1 depicts ln(worst case regret) and ln(average case regret). It is observed that
ln(worst case regret) is closely approximated by ln(173 T
2/3) while ln(average case regret) is closely approximated
by ln(13T
2/3), clearly showing that the worst case regret is O(T 2/3) and the average case regret is upper bounded
by O(T 2/3).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided characterizations for truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms for various set-
tings in the context of multi-slot pay-per-click auctions, thus generalizing the work of [3, 4] in a non-trivial
way. The first result we proved is a negative result which states that under the setting of unrestricted CTRs,
any strategyproof allocation rule is necessarily strongly pointwise monotone. We also showed that every strate-
gyproof mechanism in unrestricted CTR setting will have O(T ) regret. By weakening the notion of unrestricted
CTRs, we were able to derive a larger class of strategyproof allocation rules. Our results are summarized in the
Table 1.
In the auctions that we have considered, the auctioneer cannot vary the number of slots he wishes to display.
One possible extension of this work could be in this direction, that is, the auctioneer can dynamically decide
the number of slots for advertisements. We assume that the bidders bid their maximum willingness to pay at
the start of the first round and they would not change their bids till T rounds. Another possible extension
would be to allow the agents to bid before every round. We are also exploring the cases where the bidders have
budget constraints.
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